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Decision makers can become trapped by myopic regret avoidance in which rejecting feedback to 
avoid short-term outcome regret (regret associated with counterfactual outcome comparisons) 
leads to reduced learning and greater long-term regret over continuing poor decisions. In a series 
of laboratory experiments involving repeated choices among uncertain monetary prospects, 
participants primed with outcome regret tended to decline feedback, learned the task slowly or 
not at all, and performed poorly. This pattern was reversed when decision makers were primed 
with self-blame regret (regret over an unjustified decision). Further, in a final experiment in 
which task learning was unnecessary, feedback was more often rejected in the self-blame regret 
condition than in the outcome regret condition. We discuss the findings in terms of a distinction 
between two regret components, one associated with outcome evaluation, the other with the 
justifiability of the decision process used in making the choice. 
 
KEYWORDS: Decision Making; Decision Regret; Feedback Avoidance; Learning; Myopic 
Regret Avoidance; Regret Aversion; Outcome Regret; Self-blame Regret 
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Myopic Regret Avoidance: Feedback Avoidance and Learning in Repeated Decision Making 
Decision makers often face a dilemma as to whether or not to seek information about the 
outcomes of options they did not choose. They may seek, or deliberately avoid, information 
about the performance of a stock they decided not to purchase, of an employee they considered 
but did not hire, or of a product they examined but ultimately did not purchase. The dilemma is 
this: Receiving feedback on the outcome of unchosen options exposes the decision maker to the 
possibility of immediate painful regret if the unchosen option turns out to have done better than 
the chosen one. On the other hand the knowledge so gained may improve task knowledge and 
thus subsequent decisions, reducing regret in the longer term. Decision makers who shelter 
themselves from feedback on foregone options may thus minimize their experience of regret in 
the short term but at the cost of reduced task learning and decision quality in the longer term. We 
refer to this trap as myopic regret avoidance. 
Regret can be defined as the emotion experienced “when realizing or imagining that our 
current situation would have been better, if only we had decided differently” (Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2007, p. 3). Phenomenologically, the regret experience involves feelings that one should 
have known better, thoughts about the mistake made, a feeling of kicking oneself, and a desire to 
undo to action that caused regret (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 1998). As 
the definition suggests, regret is an emotion that is cognitively laden in that it requires us to think 
about what would have been had we acted differently. Further, the definition highlights the 
important role of counterfactual thought because the experience of regret tends to involve a 
comparison of what is with what could have been (had one chosen differently).  
Because regret is aversive, people are motivated to regulate it. In a very useful integrative 
review of existing regret research, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) developed a framework for 
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understanding regret regulation strategies. According to their regret regulation theory, regret 
regulation strategies are decision-, alternative-, or feeling-focused, and aim at either preventing 
(avoiding) future regret or managing current regret. Strategies used to manage current regret 
include such activities as justifying one’s decision (decision-focused) and denying regret 
(feeling-focused). Strategies used to prevent future regret include such activities as increasing 
decision justifiability (decision-focused), anticipating regret (feeling-focused), and avoiding 
feedback about foregone alternatives (alternative-focused).  
A large amount of research has shown that people try to avoid future regret. For example, 
in a field study Wroe, Turner, and Salkovskis (2004) compared different potential predictors of 
actual immunization decisions and found that “anticipated regret … was the strongest predictor 
of likelihood of immunizing the child” (p. 38), predicting 57% of the variance (demographic 
variables, in contrast, predicted only 1% of the variance). Reb (2008) found that regret aversion 
leads to more careful decision processing and thus higher decision justifiability. Evidence of 
regret avoidance has been found in a variety of domains including negotiations (Larrick & Boles, 
1995), consumer decisions (Simonson, 1992), health-related decisions (Connolly & Reb, 2003; 
Richard, de Vries, & van der Pligt, 1998; Wroe, Turner, & Salkovskis, 2004), and laboratory 
gambles (Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996). In a repeated decision-making 
context, experienced regret can lead to ill-advised switching behavior when a good decision 
leads to a poor outcome (Ratner & Herbst, 2005), presumably in an effort to avoid repeated 
regret. 
There is also evidence that decision makers sometimes employ the alternative-focused 
regret regulation strategy of choosing options that protect them from potentially regret-inducing 
feedback on foregone options (e.g., Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992; Larrick & Boles, 
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1995; Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; however, see also Shani & 
Zeelenberg, 2007). For example, one study found that negotiators were more likely to reach an 
agreement when doing so could shield them from learning the outcome of their “BATNA” (“best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement”) than when they expected to learn about that outcome 
(Larrick & Boles, 1995). Of course, feedback on the outcomes of foregone options not only 
poses the threat of regret, when the chosen option underperforms the competition, but also the 
opportunity for rejoicing, when the chosen option outperforms the competition (Bell, 1982; 
Loomes & Sugden, 1982). However there is considerable evidence (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Taylor, 1991) that decision makers are more concerned with avoiding negative 
experiences than they are with seeking positive ones. Our prediction, then, is that regret will 
loom larger than rejoicing, and that feedback will be associated with anticipation of overall 
negative emotions, consistent with some existing results (Larrick & Boles, 1995; Zeelenberg et 
al., 1996, Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). 
Other research found decision makers to be less likely to choose safe options over risky 
options when they expected to receive full outcome feedback (i.e., on both options regardless of 
their choice). When outcome feedback was expected only for the chosen option, however, 
preference for the safe option increased. Choosing the safe option protects one from potentially 
regret-inducing feedback since the outcome of the risky option is unknown; choosing the risky 
option exposes one to regret, since the outcome of the safe option is known without feedback 
(Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). Similarly, Mellers, Schwartz, Ho and 
Ritov (1997) found that, in choices between binary gambles, regret was more intense when both 
gambles were resolved by the outcome of a single spinner (making the outcome of the foregone 
alternative unavoidable) than when two spinners were used (so that only the outcome of the 
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chosen gamble was revealed).  
While these studies did not examine whether decision makers show myopic regret 
avoidance, they are at least consistent with the possibility. They are also consistent with recent 
theoretical work on a distinction between two components of decision-related regret (Connolly & 
Zeelenberg, 2002, who draw on a discussion by Baron & Hershey, 1988, of the common 
confusion between good decision outcomes and good decision processes). A first component, 
outcome regret, is associated with the evaluation of the outcome resulting from one’s choice, and 
is typically dependent on one or more reference points, such as the outcomes of alternatives not 
chosen, the outcome one expected, the status quo, or the outcomes received by others (see also 
Boles & Messick, 1995). Outcome regret of this sort is closely related to disappointment. A 
second component, self-blame regret, is associated with a judgment that one made an unjustified 
decision – for example, that one decided hastily or used poor information. Such an unjustified 
decision induces feelings of regret closely related to self-blame.  
The purpose of the present research is to examine whether regret aversion affects 
feedback seeking behavior in a situation of repeated choice among a set of uncertain options. 
Past research found that regret aversion led people in single-period decisions to make risk-averse 
choices in order to avoid feedback on foregone outcomes, resulting in a “regret premium” of 
about 10% relative to risk-neutral choices when feedback was inevitable (Larrick & Boles, 
1995). It is likely that the costs associated with regret-induced feedback avoidance are even 
higher in repeated decision making. In addition to the premium caused by increased risk 
aversion, when a decision is faced repeatedly there is a potential informational cost to avoiding 
feedback on foregone options: the rejected information could have improved decisions in the 
future. Similar issues are discussed in the organizational context by Denrell & March, 2001, and 
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in economic choice contexts by Camerer & Ho, 1999. Spencer, Josephs & Steele, 1993, also 
point to a balance between pain and learning in the seeking of feedback.  
If decision makers were entirely motivated to maximize information gain, they would 
always seek feedback (if it were free). However, to the extent that decision makers are 
myopically regret avoidant (i.e., try to avoid short-term outcome regret), we would expect them 
to avoid feedback on the outcomes of foregone options. Decision makers primed to be sensitive 
to outcome regret would be especially prone to such avoidance. Conversely those primed for 
self-blame regret would be more likely to seek feedback, as long as it promises to enhance task 
learning and improve decisions. We test these predictions in the following experiments. While 
our main interest lies in how regret aversion affects feedback seeking behavior, we also examine 
on a more exploratory basis effects of regret aversion on learning and performance in the 
decision tasks. 
Study 1 
We examined feedback seeking behavior in a laboratory study in which decision makers 
knew that they would repeatedly face a decision among the same three options, each offering 
uncertain real monetary outcomes. On each trial, after learning the outcome of their chosen 
option, they could choose to receive feedback on the outcomes of the two options they had 
declined. In the Control condition no special mention was made of possible outcome-related 
regret. In the Outcome Regret condition the possibility of experiencing regret as a result of 
unfavorable outcome comparisons was made especially salient. Past research has shown that 
decision makers’ choices are more strongly aimed at avoiding regret when regret is made salient 
(Richard et al, 1998; Simonson, 1992). We expected that feedback avoidance would be more 
prevalent in the Outcome Regret condition than in the Control condition.  




Procedure and Manipulations 
Participants engaged in a computer-based decision making task. Written instructions 
described the task, which consisted of 20 trials. In each trial participants had to choose one of 
three options, each of which carried uncertain monetary consequences. The same three options 
were presented on each trial. The outcome from each option was an amount of money drawn 
randomly from an underlying uniform probability distribution. No information on the means or 
ranges of these distributions was provided. Participants were given an initial endowment of $3, 
and received in addition their winnings from two randomly-selected trials in the game. Outcomes 
were given in experimental dollars, each worth one real cent. No positive payoff was guaranteed, 
but participants were assured that they could not lose any of their own money. 
After this initial orientation to the game, participants in both conditions were told: 
“After each choice the computer will determine the outcomes of the options. The 
program will then show you the outcome of the option you chose. You will then be given 
the choice to see the outcomes of the options you did not choose as well. After that you 
will go on to the next decision among the same three options.” 
The outcome regret manipulation was adapted from Simonson (1992) and included two 
components. First, participants in the Outcome Regret condition were told the following: 
“Choosing to receive feedback on the outcomes of the options you did not choose means 
that you might find out that you would have done better if you had chosen another option, 
leading to regret.” 
Second, outcome regret salience was reinforced after each trial when participants in the Outcome 
Regret condition only were asked to rate how much they regretted their previous decision.  
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After each choice, participants learned about the outcome of the chosen option. They 
were then asked whether they wanted to receive feedback on the foregone options, which they 
received if their response was affirmative. Participants in the Control condition then moved on to 
the next decision; participants in the Outcome Regret condition rated their regret before moving 
on. At the end of the study, after about 25 minutes, participants were paid in cash in local 
currency as described above (endowment plus the outcomes of two randomly selected trials), 
debriefed, and thanked for participating.  
Task structure 
The uniform probability distributions from which outcomes were drawn were: 
Option 1: U(-80, +40), Range = 120, EV = -20 
Option 2: U(-40, +40), Range = 80, EV = 0 
Option 3: U(0, +40), Range = 40, EV = +20 
Option 3 was thus unambiguously the best and Option 1 the worst of the three alternatives 
considering both expected value and downward potential (“risk”).1  
Participants 
Fifty-eight business students at a Singaporean university participated in exchange for 
course credit and monetary compensation depending on the outcome of their choices. 
Measures 
Feedback avoidance. After learning the outcome of their chosen option after each choice, 
participants were asked whether they would like to receive feedback about the outcomes of the 
options they did not choose. Their response (“get feedback” or “don’t get feedback”) was our 
measure of feedback avoidance. 
Performance. Performance was assessed through choices. In each trial, participants chose 
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an option by clicking on one of three buttons on the screen. Choices were coded as 1 if they were 
optimal (Option 3), 0 otherwise (Options 1 or 2). This coding approach is based on the 
recognition that only choice of Option 3 achieves the decision makers’ goal of choosing the best 
option (highest EV and least downward potential), whereas choice of any other option does not.2  
Results 
Outcome Regret and Feedback Seeking  
As expected, the experimental priming of outcome regret affected feedback seeking, χ2(1) 
= 26.55, p < .001 (see also Figure 1). The 30 participants in the Control condition declined 
feedback on the foregone options in 46 out of 600 choices (7.7%; 19 of the feedback-avoiding 
choices were contributed by a single individual). In contrast, the 28 participants in the Outcome 
Regret condition made 99 feedback-avoiding choices (out of 560: 17.7%). Further, more 
individuals always sought feedback in the Control condition (73.3%) than in the Outcome Regret 
condition (60.7%). Additional chi-square analyses showed that feedback avoidance was more 
common in the Control condition than in the Outcome Regret condition in both the first 10 
rounds (p < .01) and the second 10 rounds (p < .001). 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Outcome Regret and Performance  
 We expected that participants in the Control condition would over time make better 
choices than those in the Outcome Regret condition, since they received more information 
through feedback seeking. Consistent with this prediction, optimal choices increased more 
strongly from the first 10 trials to the second 10 trials in the Control condition (from 128 to 219), 
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χ2(1) = 56.60, p < .001, than in the Outcome Regret condition (from 143 to 176), χ2(1) = 7.93, p 
< .01 (see Figure 2). Further, whereas optimal choices surprisingly were more frequent in the 
Outcome Regret condition in the first half of trials (143 out of 280, or 51.1%) than in the Control 
condition (128 out of 300, or 42.7%), χ2(1) = 4.11, p = .05, as expected, in the second 10 trials 
optimal choices were more common in the Control condition (219 out of 300, or 73.0%) than in 
the Outcome Regret condition (176 out of 280, or 62.9%), χ2(1) = 6.86, p < .01. These results 
were confirmed in a binary logistic regression that showed a significant interaction between 
experimental condition and trials, B = .08, SE(B) = .02, Exp(B) = .92, Wald(df=1) = 12.75, p < 
.001. Taken together these results suggest that participants in the Outcome Regret condition were 
less able to improve their performance over time than participants in the Control condition. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
 Study 1 confirms the possibility of a damaging decision trap we have termed “myopic 
regret avoidance”. We conceived the trap as a possibility in repeated decision making when a 
decision maker, attempting to avoid the regret she may feel if she learns the outcomes of options 
she did not choose, shields herself from feedback on these other outcomes – a finding that has 
been previously reported only for single-period decisions (Josephs et al, 1992; Zeelenberg et al, 
1996). In repeated decisions, this feedback avoidance may impede task learning over time, and 
thus reduce decision quality and performance. Myopically avoiding short-term outcome regret 
may thus lead to increased longer-term regret. Consistent with this prediction, Study 1 found that 
decision makers primed with outcome regret avoided feedback more often. Moreover, these 
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participants showed less learning (probability of choosing the optimal option) over the repeated 
decision trials than participants in a control condition.  
Of the two regret components proposed by Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002), the regret 
primed in Study 1 is clearly of the outcome regret type, which is associated with receiving an 
outcome that compares unfavorably to the outcome of a foregone option. What if one primed 
self-blame regret, which is associated with having made an unjustified decision? In the context 
of decision justification theory (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) justification of a decision refers 
to justifying the decision process to oneself rather than to another person (as, for example, in the 
work on accountability; e.g., Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). A person experiences self-blame regret 
when (s)he cannot justify the decision to him- or herself as careful, thoughtful, or well-informed 
on the basis of such arguments as: “I made a careful decision”, “I collected a lot of information” 
etc.  
In the present context feedback-seeking could provide a later justification for one’s 
decision (“I sought all the available feedback”, “I tried to learn which option was best” etc.). 
Seeking feedback appears to be the reasonable, rational behavior in this situation because it 
provides additional information that can improve learning and long-term performance.3 A 
decision maker who avoids feedback could later blame him- or herself for not acquiring 
information that could have improved subsequent decisions. We therefore predicted that 
participants primed for self-blame regret would acquire more feedback, and improve their task 
learning and performance more, than would participants not so primed. Study 2 was designed to 
test this prediction. 
Study 2 
Method 




Study 2 used the same basic decision task and monetary incentives as the previous study. 
Participants knew that they would repeatedly face a decision among the same three options, each 
offering uncertain real monetary outcomes. On each trial, after learning the outcome of their 
chosen option, they could choose whether or not to receive feedback on the outcomes of the two 
options they had declined. To increase the incentive to learn, we increased the number of trials to 
50. To avoid a ceiling effect with respect to learning the best option we also made the option set 
more difficult to learn by increasing the ranges of outcomes as follows: 
Option 1: U(-180, +120), Range = 300, EV = -30 
Option 2: U(-130, +120), Range = 250, EV = -5 
Option 3: U(-80, +120), Range = 200, EV = +20 
Manipulation 
Self-blame regret was primed by using an implicit priming task to minimize possible 
demand effects of explicit manipulation.4 We used the scrambled sentence task paradigm (Bargh 
& Chartrand, 2000). In both Control and Self-blame Regret conditions, participants completed a 
seemingly unrelated scrambled sentence test before engaging in the decision making study. In 
this task, they had to form a total of 20 four-word sentences from five given words. In the Self-
blame Regret condition, 11 of the 20 tasks contained words or expressions related to regret in 
general, and self-blame regret in particular (e.g., regrets, poor choice, foregone, mistake, blame 
self) (see Appendix for complete list). In the Control condition, no such words were included. In 
post-study questioning, no participants indicated any suspicion that the sentence forming task 
may have been used to manipulate regret salience, or may have been related to the subsequent 
decision making task. 




Seventy-nine students at a Singaporean university participated for about 50 minutes in 
exchange for course credit and monetary compensation depending on the outcome of their 
choices. 
Results 
Self-blame Regret and Feedback Seeking 
 As expected, feedback seeking was affected by the manipulation of self-blame regret, 
χ2(1) = 34.16, p < .001 (see also Figure 1). Reversing the effect of outcome regret priming, self-
blame regret priming led decision makers to seek more feedback. The 38 participants in the 
Control condition declined feedback on the foregone options in about 18.2% of all choices (345 
out of 1900). In contrast the 41 participants in the Self-blame Regret condition avoided feedback 
in about 11.6% of all feedback choices (237 out of 2050). Less than half (47.4%) of participants 
in the Control condition always sought feedback, while 63.4% of participants in the Self-blame 
Regret condition did so. Further chi-square analyses showed that feedback avoidance was more 
common in the Control condition than in the Self-Blame Regret condition in both the first 25 
choices (p < .01) and the second 25 choices (p < .001). 
Self-blame Regret and Performance  
We expected that participants in the Self-blame Regret condition would over time make 
better choices than those in the Control Regret condition, since they received more information 
through feedback seeking. Consistent with this prediction, optimal choices increased 
significantly from the first 25 trials to the second 25 trials in the Self-blame Regret condition 
(from 414 to 484), χ2(1) = 9.71, p < .01, but not in the Control condition (368 vs. 401), χ2(1) = 
2.38, p = .12 (See Figure 3). Further, optimal choices were more common in the Self-blame 
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Regret (484 out of 1025, or 47.2%) than in the Control (401 out of 950, or 42.2%) condition in 
the second 25 trials, χ2(1) = 5.00, p < .05, but not in the first, χ2(1) = .56, p = .45 (Self-blame 
Regret, 414 out of 1025, or 40.4%, Control, 368 out of 950, or 38.7%). Despite these results, a 
binary logistic regression did not show a significant interaction between experimental condition 
and trials, B = .002, SE(B) = .004, Exp(B) = 1.00, Wald(df=1) = .23, ns. Nevertheless, taken 
together the results suggest that participants in the Self-blame Regret condition were better able 
to learn over time to choose the best option than participants in the Control condition.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
 FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
Study 1 showed how priming outcome regret can lead decision makers to fall into a 
myopic regret avoidance trap by rejecting feedback on foregone options. Study 2 reversed this 
tendency to feedback avoidance by priming self-blame regret. The results suggest that trying to 
avoid self-blame regret leads to more feedback seeking, which can enhance learning and decision 
quality.  
One concern regarding the comparability of Study 1 and Study 2 is the difference in the 
experimental manipulations of outcome and self-blame regret, respectively. Whereas outcome 
regret was primed explicitly in the instructions and implicitly through measurement of 
experienced regret in Study 1, self-blame regret was primed implicitly in Study 2 through an 
“unrelated” task, to avoid potential demand effects. Study 3, which follows, was designed to 
address this potential confound by comparing the effects of outcome and self-blame regret 
primed by identical methods within a single study.  





Study 3 used the same decision task, option set, number of trials (50), and monetary 
incentives as Study 2. Both self-blame regret and outcome regret were primed through the 
“unrelated” scrambled sentence task used in Study 2. In both conditions, participants were asked 
to form a total of 20 four-word sentences from five given words. In the Outcome Regret 
condition 10 of the 20 tasks contained words related to regret in general, and outcome regret in 
particular (e.g., regrets, pain, loss, outcome, foregone, compared). In the Self-blame Regret 
condition 10 of the 20 tasks contained words related to regret in general, and self-blame regret in 
particular (e.g., regrets, pain, mistake, justifiable, fault, blame self) (see Appendix for a complete 
list).  
Seventy-seven business students at a Singaporean university participated for about 50 
minutes in exchange for course credit and monetary compensation depending on the outcome of 
their choices. 
Results 
Self-blame Regret, Outcome Regret, and Feedback Seeking 
 As expected, feedback seeking was more common when self-blame regret rather than 
outcome regret was primed, χ2(1) = 168.12, p < .001 (see also Figure 1). The 38 participants in 
the Self-blame Regret condition declined feedback on the foregone options in about 10.7% of all 
choices (203 out of 1900). In contrast the 39 participants in the Outcome Regret condition 
avoided feedback in about 27.1% of all feedback choices (528 out of 1950). While less than half 
of participants (46.2%) in the Outcome Regret condition always sought feedback, the majority of 
participants (60.5%) in the Self-blame Regret condition did so. Further chi-square analyses 
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showed that feedback avoidance was more common in the Outcome Regret condition than in the 
Self-Blame Regret condition in both the first 25 choices (p < .001) and the second 25 choices (p 
< .001). 
Self-blame Regret, Outcome Regret, and Performance  
We expected that performance would improve more strongly in the Self-blame Regret 
condition. Consistent with this prediction, optimal choices increased significantly from the first 
25 trials to the second 25 trials in the Self-blame Regret condition (from 405 to 449), χ2(1) = 
4.12, p < .05, but not in the Outcome Regret condition (408 vs. 396), χ2(1) = .31, p = .61 (see 
Figure 4). Further, optimal choices were more common in the Self-blame Regret (449 out of 
950) than in the Outcome Regret (396 out of 975) condition in the second 25 trials, χ2(1) = 8.63, 
p < .01, but not in the first, χ2(1) = .12, p = .75 (Self-blame Regret, 405 out of 950, Outcome 
Regret, 408 out of 975). These results were confirmed in a binary logistic regression that showed 
a significant interaction between experimental condition and trials, B = .11, SE(B) = .01, Exp(B) 
= 1.01, Wald(df=1) = 5.66, p < .05. Follow-up analyses found a significant increase in optimal 
choices over trials in the Self-blame Regret condition (p = .01), but not in the Outcome Regret 
condition (p = .42). Taken together, these results suggest that participants in the Self-blame 
Regret condition were better able to learn over time to choose the best option than participants in 
the Outcome Regret condition.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
 FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
As expected, Study 3 showed that when it comes to feedback seeking behavior it matters 
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what type of regret decision makers are trying to avoid. Those sensitized to outcome regret 
rejected feedback on foregone options more than did those primed to self-blame regret. This led 
to marked differences in task learning, decision quality and performance favoring the self-blame 
regret group.  
These findings make sense from the perspective of decision justification theory 
(Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). When the salience of self-blame regret is high, decision makers 
are particularly concerned about acting in a way that they perceive as justifiable. In the present 
context, this implies seeking feedback on the foregone options’ outcomes in order to maximize 
information gain. However, this appears to conflict with the notion of the self-protective decision 
maker (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Josephs et al, 1992; Larrick, 1993; Larrick & Boles, 1995). 
For a self-protective decision maker, learning that another option would have led to a better 
outcome prompts the decision maker to question the wisdom of his or her choice, leading to 
recrimination and regret (Sugden, 1985). Thus, seeking feedback may lead to self-blame over 
having made the wrong choice. This line of reasoning suggests that factors that increase concern 
for self-protection, such as low self-esteem (Josephs et al, 1992) or salience of self-blame regret, 
can actually decrease feedback seeking, contrary to the present findings.  
One way to resolve this potential conflict is by considering the potential benefit for 
learning through the feedback. Low self-esteem, for example, may lead to more feedback 
seeking when this information can help prevent future failure, but less feedback seeking when 
this information cannot prevent future failure (Spencer et al, 1993). Similarly, we would expect 
that self-blame regret salience would lead to more feedback seeking when the information gained 
can help the individual make better choices in the future. However, when the available feedback 
does not provide information that can improve future decisions, we would expect self-blame 
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regret salience to lead to less feedback seeking than outcome regret salience. This prediction is 
tested in Study 4. 
Study 4 
Method 
Study 4 used the same number of trials (50), monetary incentives, and experimental 
manipulations of outcome and self-blame regret as Study 3. However we changed the decision 
making task so that information on the probability distributions of payoffs for all three options 
was provided to all participants in the initial experimental instructions. Feedback on the 
outcomes of foregone options would thus provide no additional information. As a result, there 
was no learning incentive to seek feedback on the outcomes of the foregone options.  
The payoff distributions were U(-80,+120), U(-100,+150) and U(-120,+180), chosen so 
as to have the same ranges as those in Study 3. However, in order to make the decision task non-
trivial, the highest expected value option now had the biggest range (risk) and both the largest 
upward and downward potential.  
One-hundred-four business students at a Singaporean university participated for about 50 
minutes in exchange for course credit and monetary compensation depending on the outcome of 
their choices. 
Results and Discussion 
 Overall participants’ choices favored the riskiest option (43.2%), compared to 32.7% 
choosing the moderate-risk option and 24.2% the safest option. Consistent with the assumption 
that priming self-blame regret would lead to more self-protective decisions, we found that 
participants in the Self-blame Regret condition chose the safest option more often (26.5%) than 
participants in the Outcome Regret condition (21.7%), who preferred the moderate-risk option 
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more strongly (34.8% versus 30.6% in the Self-blame Regret condition), with no differences in 
choice of the riskiest option (Outcome Regret, 43.5%, Self-blame Regret, 42.9%), χ2(2) = 19.39, 
p < .001. Most participants chose each of the three options a substantial number of times. Only 
four of 53 participants (7%) in the Self-blame Regret condition, and three of 51 participants (6%) 
in the Outcome Regret condition, chose the same option on all fifty trials. Feedback avoidance 
was somewhat more common after making the riskiest choice: 26% vs. 20% for the two less-
risky options. Despite having full prior information about the range of payoffs each option 
offered, participants appear to have done considerable shifting between options, and sought 
feedback about foregone options after the majority of their option choices. 
 Our central interest was in whether the two regret priming conditions would show 
differential effects on feedback avoidance in this no-learning task. They did. As expected, and 
opposite the results of Study 3, feedback seeking was now more common when outcome regret 
rather than self-blame regret was primed, χ2(1) = 92.39, p < .001 (see also Figure 1). The 53 
participants in the Self-blame Regret condition declined feedback on the foregone options in 
about 28.4% of all choices (752 out of 2650). In contrast the 51 participants in the Outcome 
Regret condition avoided feedback in about 17.2% of all feedback choices (438 out of 2550). 
Whereas less than half (41.5%) of participants in the Self-blame Regret condition always sought 
feedback, the majority of participants (52.9%) in the Outcome Regret condition did so. Further 
chi-square analyses showed that feedback avoidance was more common in the Self-blame Regret 
condition than in the Outcome Regret condition in both the first 25 choices (p < .001) and the 
second 25 choices (p < .001). 
 These results support the prediction that the relationship between type of regret primed 
and feedback seeking depends on the nature of the decision task. If the task is such that seeking 
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feedback on the outcomes of foregone options can be expected to contribute to learning (as in 
Study 3), decision makers sought more feedback when self-blame regret was salient than when 
outcome regret was salient. However, when the task is such that this feedback is not expected to 
contribute to learning (as in Study 4), self-blame regret salience led to less feedback seeking.  
General Discussion 
 This series of studies has examined the possibility that in repeated decisions, decision 
makers may become caught in a damaging decision trap we have termed “myopic regret 
avoidance”. The trap arises when decision makers, attempting to avoid the regret they may feel if 
they learn the outcomes of unchosen options, shield themselves from feedback on these other 
outcomes, a tendency that has been reported in single-period decisions (Josephs et al, 1992; 
Zeelenberg et al, 1996). Such feedback avoidance can impede task learning, and degrade 
decision quality, thus exacerbating long-term regret. The proposed mechanism is driven by the 
outcome regret component of Connolly and Zeelenberg’s (2002) distinction. The second 
component, self-blame regret, would be expected to have the opposite effect, leading to 
increased feedback seeking when task learning is possible.  
 In our first three experiments participants chose repeatedly among the same three options, 
each of which offered an uncertain monetary outcome. The underlying distributions of payoffs of 
the three options were initially unknown to the participants but could be (partially) learned by 
getting outcome feedback. After each choice participants were told the outcome only of their 
chosen option, but were given an opportunity to get feedback on the outcomes they would have 
received if they had chosen each of the other options. Participants were assigned either to a 
control condition (Studies 1 and 2) or to an experimental condition in which outcome regret 
(Studies 1 and 3) or self-blame regret (Studies 2 and 3) was primed.  
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 In Study 1 priming outcome regret led to increased feedback avoidance relative to a 
control condition. Primed participants also exhibited poorer task learning and decision quality. In 
contrast, priming self-blame regret (Study 2) led to increased feedback seeking relative to a 
control condition. Primed participants learned more and performed better on the decision task. In 
Study 3, feedback seeking was more common, and learning stronger, after self-blame regret 
priming than outcome regret priming. 
These findings dovetail neatly with the distinction proposed by Connolly and Zeelenberg 
(2002; cf. Connolly & Reb, 2005) between outcome regret and self-blame regret. Outcome regret 
is associated with receiving a comparatively poor outcome; self-blame regret is driven by the 
perceived justifiability of the decision process (Connolly & Reb, 2005). Outcome regret 
avoidance led decision makers to avoid the immediate regret stemming from feedback on 
foregone outcomes. However, it also led to reduced learning and performance: the myopic regret 
avoidance trap. In contrast, both feedback seeking and performance increased when self-blame 
regret was primed, suggesting that efforts to avoid this regret component can help decision 
makers to avoid the trap.  
A similar dilemma between short-term and long-term effects has been discussed in the 
closely related counterfactual thinking literature (e.g., Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). 
Upward counterfactuals, comparisons with better outcomes that could have been received, are 
thought to lead to more immediate pain but to help improve future decision making. Downward 
counterfactuals, comparison with worse outcomes that could have been received, are thought to 
lead to more positive immediate emotions but not to learning. Some research suggests that 
individuals produce more upward counterfactuals when they expect to make repeated decisions 
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993) and generate more counterfactual thoughts 
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about antecedents of a decision they have control over (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & 
McMullen, 1995). Future research could examine whether regret salience also moderates the 
production of upward versus downward counterfactuals. 
In Studies 1-3 full feedback, though threatening potentially painful outcome regret, was 
the justifiable, rational thing to do since it provided information that might improve subsequent 
decisions, reducing self-blame regret. In Study 4, participants were told beforehand the 
distributions underlying the three available options. Thus, the learning objective was eliminated 
as a justification for seeking feedback. Consistent with the notion of the self-protective decision-
maker (Josephs et al, 1992; Larrick, 1993), we expected more feedback avoidance after self-
blame regret priming. Participants primed for self-blame regret received no task-learning benefit 
from seeking feedback to compensate them for the heightened challenge to their decisional 
competence of realizing that an alternative choice would have yielded a better outcome. 
Avoiding such a challenge, they declined feedback significantly more often than did participants 
primed for outcome regret. The results suggest that both regret avoidance and self-protection 
motives are particularly influential in the absence of learning and performance motives.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The findings are, of course, subject to the usual cautions associated with generalizing 
from laboratory experiments involving student participants, unfamiliar tasks and small 
incentives. They constitute no more than an existence proof, a demonstration that efforts to avoid 
outcome regret can lead to a myopic regret avoidance trap, while efforts to avoid self-blame 
regret can lead to increased feedback seeking and improve learning and performance. Our 
findings raise the question whether these effects have important real-world analogs. For example, 
in the area of financial decision making, fear of outcome regret might lead investors to seek less 
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feedback on the performance of stocks they considered but did not buy, and this may result in 
poorer performance over time. On the other hand, fear of self-blame regret might lead to more 
feedback seeking and better performance over time. Similarly, in an organizational context, fear 
of outcome and self-blame regret might affect feedback seeking, and subsequent learning and 
future performance, following decisions such as which person to hire, which graduate student to 
admit to a PhD program, or what project to invest in. Undoubtedly, future studies extending the 
current findings to such important decision domains would be very useful. 
An obvious extension of the current studies would be to test whether outcome and self-
blame regret aversion can be induced not only externally by regret-related thoughts but also by 
stable individual differences in the likelihood to experience regret (e.g. Josephs et al, 1992; 
Schwartz et al, 2002). Individuals who are more inclined to experience regret associated with 
their decision outcomes might be particularly prone to entrapment by myopic regret aversion 
because their anticipated and experienced outcome regret might lead them to avoid feedback in 
repeated decision situations, possibly resulting in less learning. Sadly, this reasoning suggests 
that individuals who most dread the pain of regret may also be those most likely to encounter it, 
as their short-term avoidant strategies lead them more frequently to long-term poor decisions. 
Conclusion 
 This research contributes to the discussion of whether regret in particular (e.g., Bittner, 
1992; Sugden, 1985; Zeelenberg, 1999) and emotions in general (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Elster, 
1996; 1998; Frank, 1988) are a help or a hindrance in decision making. It has been argued that 
experiencing regret is essential for learning to improve one’s decisions in the future (Roese, 
2005). Regret can tell us that we could have done better by choosing a different option, perhaps 
increasing the probability of better choices (and thus less regret) in the future. It is, however, 
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painful in the short run. Whether regret avoidance leads to better or worse decision making 
depends on the way in which decision makers try to avoid regret. If they try to avoid (outcome) 
regret by avoiding potentially regret-inducing feedback, they are likely to continue over time to 
make poor (and regrettable) decisions. Such feedback avoidance may have substantial negative 
effects on learning and performance in repeated decision making tasks. It is in this sense that we 
refer to myopic regret avoidance as a trap. If, on the other hand, decision makers try to avoid 
(self-blame) regret by seeking feedback on foregone options, accepting immediate regret in order 
to learn to improve their future decision making, the influence of regret aversion on decision 
making seems beneficial.  




1 In a pilot study we used a task in which the three payoff distributions were U(-80,+120), U(-
125,+125) and U(-180,+120). This proved too hard a task for participants to show significant 
learning over 20 trials, since all three gambles yielded a wide range of positive and negative 
outcomes. Interestingly, the outcome regret manipulation led to substantially more feedback 
avoidance than in Study 1. This is consistent with our proposed mechanism of a tradeoff between 
short-term and long-term regret. In the high-variance gambles, there was plenty of short-term 
pain for the regret-salient subjects, and no long-term gain in the form of task learning. Many of 
our subjects chose to reduce the short-term regret by refusing feedback. 
2 We have also performed the analyses reported below maintaining the distinction among the 
three options. Because these analyses yielded essentially the same results, for clarity we present 
analyses of the binary measure collapsing the worst and second-best options.  
3 Note that more information through feedback on the foregone or received outcomes does not 
necessarily lead to learning and better future decision making (e.g., Brehmer, 1980; Hogarth, 
McKenzie, Gibbs, & Marquis, 1991; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996) even though that seems to be the 
case in the specific decision task used in the present studies. For example, Thaler, Tversky, 
Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997) showed how the combination of myopic loss aversion and 
frequent outcome feedback can lead to worse decisions over time. What we are arguing is that, 
from the perspective of a decision maker, it is the justifiable and reasonable thing to do to seek 
(free) feedback, rather than to avoid it (after all, even if there is no guarantee that the additional 
information will help, it is certain that the information one does not even seek cannot help).     
4 Given the issues of justification and blame involved (Tetlock & Lerner, 1999), we were more 
concerned about such potential demand effects in this case than in the case of outcome regret. 




Words and expressions used in Study 2 to prime self-blame regret:  
worried; carefully; wish otherwise; pain; poor choice; foregone; mistake; blame self; compared; 
loss; regrets 
 
Words and expressions used in Studies 3 and 4 to prime outcome regret:  
worried; wish otherwise; pain; lost; regrets; bad luck; outcome; compared; loss; forgone 
 
Words and expressions used in Studies 3 and 4 to prime self-blame regret:  
worried; carefully; pain; poor choice; regrets; mistake; decision process; blame self; justifiable; 
fault 
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Figure 1: Mean percentage of choices avoiding feedback on foregone options by experimental 
condition for Studies 1-4 
 
 
 Notes. Studies 1-3 used a learning task in which feedback seeking provided useful information 
about the nature of the available options; Study 4 used a no-learning task in which feedback 

























Outcome Regret Control Self-blame Regret
Myopic Regret Avoidance 
 
34
Figure 2: Mean percentage of choices of best option, by block of trials and experimental 
























Myopic Regret Avoidance 
 
35
Figure 3: Mean percentage of choices of best option, by block of trials and experimental 























Myopic Regret Avoidance 
 
36
Figure 4: Mean percentage of choices of best option, by block of trials and experimental 
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